Reading Aldous Huxley's classic Brave New World I was struck by how utopian his dystopia is. Huxley
does not present a world that is obviously wrong from the inside, since the
inhabitants suffer from the same corruption that plagues their society. It is
only from the perspective of an outsider, or someone imperfectly adjusted to
the system, that one can see just how out-of-sync the society is with human
nature. This makes for an interesting angle and a welcome contrast from other
dystopian fiction where the systemic problems are apparent to all yet the
characters feel powerless to do anything about it. However, from the
perspective of a prediction of the future, Brave
New World comes across as overly optimistic. It should be noted however
that Brave New World takes place so
far in the future (around the seventh century A.F. - After Ford, Henry Ford
that is) that any assignments of optimistic or pessimistic are in truth
entirely useless. All is speculation, beyond that there is little we can say.
Next, there's the fact that the world state is so good at
what it does. In Brave New World
Revisited Huxley makes the case that advances in science will serve to make
the job of the would-be dictator increasingly easier, and that techniques of
controlling others are shifting from a sort of pseudo-science into actual
science, so that they are becoming increasingly effective. Brave New World represents a sort of end game, where the world
state is quite expert at what it does, the business of controlling others.
Where does this seem overly optimistic to me? Well, it is rare that we see
human systems developed to the point of perfection. Always there is a level
where things are 'good enough', that is where further perfection is no longer
economically justifiable. In the case of a social organization, the system is
'good enough' when its imperfections no longer pose any significant threat to
its stability. Consider the problem of crime. Suppose we have at hand two
methods of dealing with it: rehabilitation and punishment. For simplicity's
sake let us imagine that each time rehabilitation is applied to a sample of
criminals we find that it is 50% effective. Those non-rehabilitated criminals
may then either be sent for another round of rehabilitation (which will also be
50% effective) or sent for punishment (removed from society altogether). We can
see that some few individuals will require many rounds of rehabilitation before
they can be reintegrated into society. Whether we are willing to carry this
through all the way, or the point at which we decide to cut-off the
rehabilitation will depend on the cost of the rehabilitation treatment and the
potential economic benefit from the rehabilitated criminals. At some point, we
will decide that the few stubborn criminals are not worth the cost, we will
deem them 'irredeemable' and have them exiled. Part of Huxley's argument is
that science is making certain methods of control (certainly drugs) so cheap
that they are effectively free. Then our economic analysis becomes essentially
unimportant, as we can afford to use as many rounds of rehabilitation as we
like, since the nominal cost of each round is so small in comparison to the
potential economic benefit of a rehabilitated criminal. In the pessimistic
dystopia, the methods of control don't quite work perfectly, they have a
not-insignificant economic cost, and so there always remains a general level of
misery in the society. In Huxley's 'optimistic' dystopia, the methods of
control are effectively free, so that it may appear to be a utopia from a
certain perspective. Whether one is more realistic than the other is perhaps
not possible to say. If methods of control are developed and perfected through
long and predictable research in incremental steps providing diminishing
returns then the pessimistic dystopia seems most probable. However, if methods
of control are discovered in leaps and bounds through unpredictable
breakthroughs then there seems to be no reason for the optimistic dystopia to
not prevail. In reality both of these modes of development are at play. What
perhaps makes Huxley's Brave New World
seem unrealistic is the completeness to which it hews toward one end of the
spectrum (certainly for the sake of simplicity of argument), rather than
incorporating a mixture of nearly perfect and clearly imperfect methods of
control. Again, Huxley is writing far in the future, so the society portrayed
is a sort of 'end-game', and therefore everything is taken to its extreme.
Then there is the way Huxley's world state deals with
dissent. Again in Brave New World
Revisited Huxley makes the case that methods of positive reinforcement are
far more effective than those of negative reinforcement. Owing to this innate
difference of effectiveness, totalitarian regimes, if persisting long enough
through time, will gradually transition to more and more use methods of
positive reinforcement and phase out those of negative reinforcement. At the
end Bernard and Helmholtz are exiled to the Falkland Islands for their dissent
against the state. There they are free to live as they choose among other
exiles and struggle to eke out an existence free both from security and
oppression. From a practical perspective there seems to be nothing wrong with
the punishment in Huxley's world state. Most dissidents can be treated,
rehabilitated and reintegrated into society. Those who cannot be are shipped
off, out-of-sight and out-of-mind. Only a small number need be exiled. Since
punitive forms of punishment pale in effectiveness in comparison to the softer
methods the state has at hand, they are no longer even employed. To me again
this seems overly optimistic in the way that it assumes the state could be
guided by purely practical considerations, particularly in the area of
punishment. No doubt this serves Huxley's argument, for even in this purely
pragmatic and scientific society he is able to paint a picture of a dystopia. However,
it seems to badly gloss over the revengefulness of human nature. Methods of
punishment, even if ineffective, need not be phased out, particularly if their
cost is small. And if the cost of rewards is relatively cheap then it seems the
cost of at least certain punishments could be cheap also. Assessments of the
effectiveness of punishment tend to focus on the one being punished as the
subject. As such they inevitably determine that punishment is not very
effective. However, this somewhat misses the point of punishment. The subject
of punishment is not the one being punished, but rather the audience of the
punishment. We don't punish for the benefit of the criminal, but for the
benefit of our own revengeful natures, to feed our own hatred. In this regard,
punishment can be quite effective, and is of course unmatched by rehabilitation
in cultivating hatred. And why shouldn't a totalitarian state want to cultivate
hatred? This too can be wielded as a method of control. In Brave New World the individual is completely subordinated to the
state, the individual hardly exists even as a concept, so any inhumanity
exacted against an individual by the state can hardly be said to be such a
thing at all. Humanity belongs to the group, not the individual. So punishment by
exile strikes me as far too lenient of a punishment. In a pessimistic dystopia,
the methods of punishment have been perfected, sharpened for cruelty, and are
deployed expertly against the group. I see little reason why the world state
would refrain from becoming exceedingly good at the business of being evil.
Another optimistic aspect of Huxley's dystopia is the
presence of reserves. These are large tracts of land inhabited by natives who
live in tribal societies where they breed freely and live not unlike the bulk
of humanity for much of its existence. That there might be areas of land left
undeveloped is not inconceivable, all that is required is that the potential
economic benefit of the land does not exceed the cost of developing it. But
still, it seems to shine a ray of hope that amidst the termitary of the world
state, there are still patches where humans can be humans, warts and all, and
perhaps more surprisingly, members of the world state are able to visit these
places provided they get special permission.
Finally, Huxley's Brave New World is a world at peace. Again
this simplification serves to amplify his argument, for it is a world at peace,
yet it is not at peace with itself, because it runs against human nature.
However, this type of stability is again optimistic. It seems to me plausible
that the world state might achieve a sort of quasi-equilibrium through a
continuous war-and-peace cycle and that once achieved it may be easier to
maintain indefinitely than a stability of constant peace. Huxley posits all
kinds of mindless entertaining distractions meant to keep inhabitants from
looking too inwardly on their own lives, which serve as stabilizing forces
during peacetime. War is an excellent tool for cultivating both social cohesion
and hatred. Once acquired, such a tool is not easily relinquished. It therefore
seems to me more plausible that war would remain in the world state's arsenal,
to be deployed as it saw fit. Further, the threat of global civilization-ending
war is one of the chief justifications for the world state. With
over-population come the twin threats of ecological collapse and civilizational
collapse from conflict. Only the world state is equipped to deal with these
problems. But, in order for these threats to continue to justify the world
state's existence, they must remain at least at the periphery of awareness. If
the world state is too good at its job, making the world so peaceful and
stable, then its citizens may come to doubt the necessity of its existence. All
alternative forms of social organization must be continually made to seem
nonviable in order to perpetuate the continual existence of the world state, and
periodic wars (these can be asymmetric conflicts including terrorism) are a key
weapon in that arsenal.
The completeness with which the world state exercises its
control led to a certain difficulty I encountered while reading Brave New World. Its issues are only
apparent from the outside. We note that its structure is incompatible with
human nature. We know that it has retarded, stunted and misshapen humanity.
However, the means with which it has done so are so complete. The world state
completely controls breeding and conditioning, so that by heredity and
environment citizens have their natures shifted to be in lock-step with the
society. However, there is nothing absolute, eternal or timeless about human
nature. What is human nature except an evolved set of behaviours and traits
developed in tandem with our environment over the course of history? If we
develop a social organization at odds with our natures then we come into
conflicts and we can find fault with our organization. But if we have the
technology and the knowledge to change our natures to our form of organization,
then the conflicts disappear. If the process of alteration (or rather
adaptation) is carried out perfectly, or nearly perfectly as is evident in
biological systems, I find it difficult to point an accusatory finger at the
combined biological-social construct. Is a penguin lamentable because it has
lost the power of flight? The penguin is as perfectly adapted to its mode of
living as the eagle is to his own. I don't think it's possible to give
preference to one over the other. From Huxley's perspective, humans are
mildly-social animals, and we ought to use our natures as our guides in the
development of our social organizations. From purely practical considerations I
agree that this is the best course. But assuming we could perfectly (or nearly
perfectly) change our natures according to our will, is such an alternate
course at arriving at a compatible biological-social construct so detestable?
Perhaps Huxley would have anticipated this thinking. In Brave New World Revisited he seems to foresee a time when certain
questions cannot be asked, perhaps cannot even be thought. Perhaps implicit in
his thinking is an ideal human, a notion that is almost alien to my later
thinking.
Of course, to hold people deliberately below their
potential, to suppress their ability is a terrible thing. But if the
suppression happens early enough in their development, or in the distant past
down some genetic line, the issue is less clear. We might well ask what
potentialities we have suppressed through our own lack of breeding through
generations (or rather our lack of thoughtful and deliberate breeding). How
much more highly organized might we be? A chimpanzee does not dream of becoming
an astronaut one day, we are cruel to the chimp when we deny him the ability to
be a free chimpanzee, not by preventing him from being an astronaut. And indeed
no prevention is necessary, the barriers seem nearly insurmountable on their
own. So while on the one hand I feel a certain disgust at the creation of the
Delta-caste in Brave New World, the
deliberately nearly sub-human lower class, that they are perfectly content in
their lot and seem incapable of aspiring to more speaks to the perfection with
which the world state has altered human nature. So long as it is possible for
these Deltas to want to aspire to more, to be able to achieve more, then we can
speak sensibly of their cruel suppression. But if they are so perfectly made
and conditioned to their posts that they are incapable of aspiration, then I am
at a loss about lamenting their state of affairs. To want to see a perfect
Delta live the life of an Alpha seems about as sensible as desiring a
chimpanzee to be a maven of business and industry.
My objection to the optimistic dystopia then comes about
because it is difficult to oppose. Presented as perfectly executed, it is an
alternative state of organization rather than one that is deeply flawed and to
be avoided. It's not that I would want to live in Brave New World or anything of the sort. But rather that reading
about it felt a bit like arriving in a termite colony and then being disgusted
at their lack of individuality and freedom. As long as the inhabitants of the
world state are human beings as-we-know-them
then we may sensibly object to their condition. But if their natures have been
changed, near-perfectly so, then they are not really human anymore. I don't see
it as Huxley's intent for us to consider the characters of Brave New World as non-human, so I feel that a little more
imperfection in the world state would help in this regard.
References
Huxley, Aldous. (1932) Brave New World. London, UK: Chatto & Windus.
Huxley, Aldous. (1958) Brave New World Revisited. New York City, USA: Harper & Brothers.
